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Abstract 
An important determinant of ecosystem services provision from European farmland is the 
amount and spatial arrangement of trees, shrubs, and woodlands that are integrated into the 
respective  land  use  systems.  Farm  trees  are  considered  ‘keystone  structures’  of 
agroecosystems because of their disproportionally large ecological value (relative to their low 
abundance),  but  are  threatened  by  agricultural  intensification,  land  abandonment,  and 
urbanization. While the preservation of farm trees is a component of several command-and-
control  approaches  and  while  numerous  payment  schemes  for  ecosystem  services  (PES 
schemes) provided through agricultural practices do in general exist, there are few incentive-
based  policies  that  specifically  target  the  conservation  of  farm  trees.  This  paper  uses  an 
institutional  economics  framework  for  the  analysis  of  PES  schemes  that  enhance  the 
establishment, protection, and management of farm trees. Using the German state of Saxony 
as a case, it elaborates on the reasons for the very reluctant participation of farmers in these 
schemes. The obstacles identified include high production and opportunity costs, contractual 
uncertainties,  and  land  tenure  implications.  Further,  since  scheme  adoption  has  been  low 
compared with the total area covered by the respective farm tree types, the PES schemes 
alone cannot explain the substantial increase in number and size of some farm-tree types. 
Options  to  improve  participation  comprise  regionalised  premiums,  result-oriented 
remuneration,  and  cooperative  approaches.  The  example  of  PES  schemes  for  farm  trees 
highlights  one  of  the  major  challenges  for  the  protection  and  preservation  of  cultural 
landscapes:  they  are  man-made  and  thus  need  to  be  preserved,  managed,  and  maintained 
continuously.  
Keywords: Payments for ecosystem services (PES), agroecosystems, trees outside forests, 
institutional economics, East Germany, Saxony 
1. Introduction 
With estimates for agricultural crops and pasturelands ranging between 24% and 38% of the 
global  land  area,  the  ecological  services  that  agricultural  systems  provide  are  of  utmost 
societal importance (Swinton et al. 2007). The agricultural sector is considered to be the most 
important  “ecosystem  services  industry”  by  the  Millennium  Ecosystem  Assessment  (MA 
2005). Depending on the specific agricultural system, provision of food, fibre, and fuel can be 
accompanied not only by a range of regulating and cultural ecosystem services, but also by 
dis-services to society, for example habitat loss, nutrient runoff, or pesticide poisoning of non-
target species (Zhang et al. 2007). An important determinant of ecosystem services provision 
from  European  farmland  is  the  amount  and  spatial  arrangement  of  trees,  shrubs,  and 
woodlands that are integrated into the respective land use systems (Auclair et al. 2000). These 
landscape elements have been conceptualized as ‘farm trees’ (Arnold & Deewes 1997) or 
‘trees outside forests’ (FAO 2001). The FAO (2000: 40) defines them as ‘all trees excluded 
from the definition of forest and other wooded lands’. Farm trees may be a spontaneously 
occurring resource or they may have been deliberately planted, domesticated, and cultivated 
(FAO 2001). Farm trees are considered ‘keystone structures’ of agroecosystems (Gibbons et 
al.  2008)  because  of  their  disproportionally  large  ecological  value  (relative  to  their  low 
abundance).  They  provide  important  ecosystem  services,  such  as  buffering  groundwater 
pollution  (Ryszkowski  &  Kedziora  2007)  or  controlling  surface  runoff  and  soil  erosion 
(Pattanayak & Mercer 1997). As a visual component of agricultural landscapes they offer 
important cultural services (McCollin 2000). Only recently has the contribution of farm trees 
towards the mitigation of (Nair et al. 2009) and adaptation to (Verchot et al. 2007) climate 
change been acknowledged. Farm trees also assist adaptive responses of organisms and, thus, 
can help to overcome the interacting negative effects of climate change and land use change 
on biodiversity (Manning et al. 2009).   
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Given all of these benefits, it is a cause of concern that a number of case studies from around 
the world report that farm trees are in serious decline in all their forms, that is, in natural, 
cultural, and recently modified landscapes. Among the most common threats are direct legal 
or illegal clearing, gradual regression through lack of tree regeneration, pathogens degrading 
tree health, shrub encroachment, abandonment of traditional grazing regimes, and agricultural 
intensification (Manning et al. 2006). For centuries, retaining trees in agricultural landscapes 
has been a common practice throughout  Europe (Eichhorn et al. 2006). Since the 1950s, 
socioeconomic  changes  have  caused  a  strong  decline  of  these  practices,  along  with  the 
abandonment  of  many  land  use  forms  on  marginal  sites  and  the  intensification, 
mechanisation,  and  structural  simplification  of  land  uses  on  fertile  soils  (Vos  &  Meekes 
1999).  
While  the  preservation  of  farm  trees  is  a  component  of  several  command-and-control 
approaches – for example, state conservation acts that prohibit the destruction of hedgerows, 
copses,  and  scattered  fruit  trees  –  and  while  numerous  payment  schemes  for  ecosystem 
services provided through agricultural practices do in general exist, there are few incentive-
based  policies  in  place  that  specifically  target  the  conservation  of  farm  trees.  However, 
interest in establishing farm trees as alternative land use forms is rising. For example, the 
European  Council  Regulation  on  the  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development 
(EAFRD) states: “Agri-forestry systems have a high ecological and social value by combining 
extensive agriculture and forestry systems, aimed at the production of high-quality wood and 
other forest products. Their establishment should be supported” (European Union 2005: 5). 
The present study focuses on PES schemes that enhance the retaining of trees in agricultural 
landscapes, using the German state of Saxony as a case. Our aim is to employ an institutional 
economics framework to understand why PES schemes for trees in agricultural landscapes are 
rarely found in central Europe, despite their mentioned benefits. Further, the reasons for the 
often very limited/reluctant participation of farmers and other land users in these schemes will 
be elaborated on. We analyze the obstacles to design and implementation of cost-effective 
PES schemes and seek to contribute towards the design of ‘better’ policies to promote the 
services provided by farm trees. We argue that, for farm-tree related PES schemes to become 
successful, specific resource characteristics – for example, rivalry, asset specificity, and joint 
production – need to be taken into consideration. The structure of the paper is as follows. 
First, we introduce an institutional economics-informed framework for the analysis of PES 
schemes related to farm trees. Second, we present a case study on farm trees and their role in 
the agricultural landscapes of Saxony, Germany. Third, an overview of existing incentive-
based approaches to establish, preserve, and manage farm trees and their ecosystem services 
will be given. Fourth, obstacles to the implementation of these PES will be analysed. Fifth, 
suggestions for a more successful implementation of PES and insights concerning the wider 
debate on PES schemes in agroecosystems will be offered. 
2. An institutional economics framework for analysing farm-tree related PES schemes  
The performance of policy instruments can be evaluated against a number of criteria (see e.g., 
Bemelmans-Videc  et  al.  2007),  the  most  common  of  which  are  effectiveness  and  cost-
effectiveness (efficiency). In this section we first explore these two categories in some depth 
and then highlight some attributes of ecosystem services affecting effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness  of  PES  schemes  in  general  and  of  those  for  farm  trees,  in  particular.  The 
(environmental) effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of PES schemes may differ substantially. 
While effectiveness refers to the accuracy and completeness with which the specified goals or 
policy objectives can be achieved, cost-effectiveness is determined by relating the resources 
expended (costs) to the accuracy and completeness of goals or policy objectives achieved. 
Considerations  of  cost-effectiveness  refer  to  the  economic  costs  that  society  incurs  for 
carrying out a certain policy. Two main cost categories can be distinguished: Production costs  
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refer to the  costs of the actual  activities that have to be undertaken by actors to provide 
ecosystem services. Cost differences may arise if an ecosystem service can be produced in 
different ways. Furthermore, the costs and benefits of certain individual measures to provide 
ecosystem services are subject to spatial and temporal variations; for example, the costs and 
benefits of hedgerows to reduce soil erosion due to water and wind differ depending on the 
slope and the soils of the adjacent land plots as well as on the frequency and the time of year 
when maintenance is carried out. Further, production costs also include profits foregone (i.e. 
opportunity  costs)  when  carrying  out  the  activities  prescribed  by  the  PES  scheme,  which 
might include lower yields. Transaction costs are not only incurred by the private sector, but 
also by the public sector at the administrative and political levels.  
The effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of policy instruments in general, and PES schemes in 
particular  are  strongly  influenced  by  the  characteristics  of  the  ecosystem,  the  ecosystem 
services,  and  the  related  transactions  targeted  (Hagedorn  et  al.  2002).  Management  and 
preservation of farm trees is connected with multiple transactions, ranging from the planting 
and maintenance of trees and shrubs through the production and selling of firewood and fruit 
to the ‘production’ of scenic landscape values for people living in or visiting the area. It is 
usually not possible to exclude people from benefiting from the aesthetic value of farm trees, 
in  particular  scattered  fruit-tree  meadows.  While  enjoying  the  aesthetic  services  of  a 
landscape  and  its  biodiversity  are  (as  pure  public  goods)  non-rival  in  consumption,  the 
production of, for example, fruit or firewood covers a particular piece of land. Thus, there is 
rivalry with respect to alternative land uses, and the resource unit is both site-specific and 
immobile. Further, most ecosystem goods and services provided by farm trees are produced 
jointly  and  can,  consequently,  hardly  be  separately  regulated.  For  example,  planting  and 
maintaining hedgerows for the reduction of soil erosion due to wind and water also produces 
habitats for a wide range of species and, thus, may increase biodiversity. Here, it is also 
important  to  consider  that  farm  trees  are  part  of  semi-natural  ecosystems  that  have  been 
shaped by human uses. These are low-intensity systems that need to be maintained through 
extensive land management. Planting and maintenance of farm trees is knowledge intensive 
and  specific,  and  there  is  also  some  moderate  capital  specificity  involved.  For  example, 
special machineries or technologies for pruning trees or maintaining hedgerows often cannot 
be  used  for  other  purposes.  Further,  these  management  practices  have  to  be  carried  out 
regularly, though usually only with a moderate frequency. Although the production process of 
farm trees depends to some extent on stochastic events, such as rainfall, the related natural 
cause–effect  relationships  are  rather  regular,  continuous,  and  well-known  in  farm  tree 
ecosystems. In addition to rivalry in production, non-excludability, and required asset-specific 
investments, we therefore consider the maintenance of farm trees as a non-heterogeneous, 
non-variable  transaction  of  regular  but  moderate  frequency.  Its  effects  are  reversible,  yet 
reconversion from a different land use is only possible in the medium term. 
3. Farm trees in Saxony 
The Eastern German state of Saxony is a highly illustrative and typical case of farm trees and 
related PES. It extends over an area of about 18,400 km
2, adjoining Poland in the East and the 
Czech Republic in the South. Saxony’s topography is characterised by plain areas (dominated 
by  heath  land)  in  the  Western  and  Northern  parts,  where  open-cast  lignite  mining  has 
impacted the landscapes. The South is covered by low mountain ranges, reaching up to 1,215 
m in altitude. The land between is a gently undulated area, covered by fertile Loess soils 
(Mannsfeld & Syrbe 2008). Farm trees are characteristic elements of Saxony’s agricultural 
landscapes, with common types including isolated trees, hedgerows, meadows with scattered 
fruit trees (Streuobst), woodlots, shrublands, and tree rows (see Fig. 1 for an example). Many 
farm trees have been lost in past decades, particularly in consequence of the intensification of 
agricultural production implemented under the former German Democratic Republic (GDR)  
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of the 1960s and 1970s. Following the promotion of large-scale agro-commodity production, 
large-scale landscape interventions (‘ameliorations’) were carried out in order to allow heavy 
machinery  to  operate  (Philipp  1997).  Consequently,  many  ‘disturbing’  and  ‘inoperable’ 
hedgerows, groups of trees, and alleys were eliminated. In the 1980s, there was a counter-
trend in which – besides other measures – establishment of shelterbelts as a measure against 
soil erosion was promoted, but in most cases this has not been enough to reverse the large-
scale landscape modifications that had been made. Since German reunification in 1990, nature 
protection, extensification of farming, and later the concept of ecosystem services provided by 
farm trees have become more prominent. At the same time, however, agricultural production 
has remained rather intensive, due to pressure from the EU CAP. The changes in number and 
area  or  (row)  length  of  the  various  types  of  farm  trees  in  this  period  (1992/93-2005),  as 
assessed  through  state  habitat  and  land  use  inventories,  offer  a  mixed  picture.  While  the 
number  of  and  area  covered  by  scattered  fruit-tree  meadows  as  well  as  isolated  trees 
decreased drastically, other farm-tree types, in particular hedgerows, exhibit an opposite trend 
(see Table 1). 
Figure 1 Exemplary spatial distribution of various types of farm trees inWeißenberg, Saxony  
 
Source: ATKIS®-DOP, © Staatsbetrieb Geobasisinformation und Vermessung Sachsen 2010. 
Table 1 Changes in number, area, and (row) length of farm trees in Saxony 1992/93 - 2005  
Number  Area / Length   
1992/93  2005 
Change 





20,528  11,733  -42.8%  10,724.6 ha  6,146.9 ha  -42.7% 
Woodlots  39,274  47,891  +21.9%  9,704.2 ha  10,707.7 ha  +10.3% 
Shrublands  2,549  4,671  +83.2%  847.3 ha  1,108.0 ha  +30.8% 
Tree rows  93,245  140,774  +51.0%  8,283.5 km  16,481.4 km  +99.0% 
Hedgerows  27,341  70,815  +159.0%  2,893.4 km  6,372.8 km  +120.3% 
Isolated trees  47,716  29,090  -39.0%  -  -  - 
Source: Own computation; land cover data provided by the Saxony State Office for the Environment, 
Agriculture and Geology, Dresden. Note: Data may also include trees outside agricultural areas, for 
example along roads or water bodies 
Farm trees occupy parts of Saxony’s agroecosystems that cover more than 50% (915,000 ha) 
of the state’s total land area. The major share of the agricultural land is used as arable land 
(79%), and only 21% for grassland farming. The main crops grown on the arable land include 
wheat, barley, oats, rye, maize, potatoes, and sugar beets (SMUL 2010a). Average soil quality 
in Saxony is relatively poor – 46.4 for arable land and 41.8 for grassland, according to the 
German agronomic yield index – yet soil qualities differ substantially across the state. Almost 
39% of the agricultural land is characterised as less favoured areas (SMUL 2009a: 47). 
In 2009, there were 6,896 agricultural enterprises, including 634 corporate firms (joint stock 
companies,  limited  liability  companies,  and  producer  cooperatives)  and  6,262  individual 
operations, of which 4,016 were managed by part-time farmers. While most agricultural firms 
(5,440) farmed less than 100 ha, there were also 467 enterprises farming 500 ha and more  
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(SMUL 2010a). After 1990, collectivised farmland was restituted to the former legal owners 
and  a  relatively  fragmented  land  tenure  structure  arose.  Most  of  the  new/old  landowners 
quickly  leased  their  land  to  newly  restructured  and  reorganised  cooperatives  and  other 
agricultural enterprises. Although the share of leased agricultural land has been decreasing in 
Saxony, from 89% in 1993 to 79.7% in 2007, leasehold remains dominant (Winkler 2010: 4). 
While leasehold prices for arable land and grassland have been increasing steadily since 1991 
– from about 71 € and 51 €/ha in 1991 to about 126 € and 72 €/ha in 2007, respectively – 
average sales prices for agricultural land went down from about 4,600 €/ha in 1999 to 3,800 
€/ha in 2004, before increasing again to reach 4,400 €/ha in 2007 (ibid: 9). 
4 Incentive-based schemes for the plantation and management of farm trees in Saxony 
Incentive-based schemes for ecosystem services in European agriculture are mainly rooted in 
agriculture  and  nature-conservation  policies,  expanding  upon  two  command-and-control 
policies relevant for farm tree preservation that will be briefly introduced at this point. The 
Saxonian Law concerning Nature Protection and Landcare (Sächsisches Naturschutzgesetz), 
implemented in 1992, legally protects certain types of farm trees. Among other things, it is 
generally forbidden to remove or damage shrubs and scattered fruit-tree meadows; yet, state 
authorities  for  nature  protection  may  allow  exceptions.  Additionally,  concrete  landscape 
elements, such as hedgerows, tree rows, and isolated trees may be designated for protection 
by  the  state  authorities  if  the  respective  elements  are  characteristic  of  the  surrounding 
landscape. Finally, some relevant landscape elements, such as isolated single trees, can be 
declared natural monuments with the effect that their removal or damage is strictly prohibited. 
However, while the legal protection of farm trees is rather effective, there is no related legal 
obligation to actively maintain the protected farm trees. This legal gap may be responsible for 
the great reduction since 1992 of isolated trees (often overaged and in need of regeneration) 
and meadows with scattered fruit trees (not viable without active management) (Table 1). The 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU in 2003 introduced the concept 
of cross compliance. Farmers will only receive (full) direct payments if they respect defined 
standards  based  on  existing  EU  regulations  and  directives  concerning  environmental 
protection, food and  fodder quality, and animal health and welfare,  as well as on related 
national regulations (Dupraz et al. 2010). In this context, Germany has established specific 
standards  for  Good  Farming  Practices  (GFP),  such  as  maintenance  of  set-aside  land, 
compulsory measures for preventing soil erosion, crop rotation, and preservation of landscape 
elements,  such  as  farm  trees.  With  respect  to  the  latter,  it  is  forbidden  to  fully  or  partly 
remove 1) hedgerows longer than 20 m, 2) tree rows of at least five trees and longer than 50 
m, 3) woodlots from 100 m
2 to 2,000 m
2 in extent, and 4) isolated trees which are designated 
as natural monuments (Knickel et al. 2001). Yet, GFP do not include provisions to ensure 
maintenance  of  the  above-mentioned  farm  trees.  In  general,  the  protection  of  abiotic 
resources, such as soil and water, is perceived predominantly as a basic component of GFP, 
whereas the active management of biotic and aesthetic natural resources, such as farm trees, is 
often regarded as exceeding this standard and thus would require compensation (Weins 2001). 
Since the early 1990s, various successive regulations have been instituted by the European 
Commission to foster rural development in the Member States. Unlike price supports and later 
direct  payments,  these  Rural  Development  Regulations  have  been  intended  to  promote, 
among other things, environmentally friendly farming practices, extensive forms of arable- 
and grass-land farming, and the long-term set-aside of farm land. However, apart from the 
environmental  objectives,  the  regulations  have  also  been  explicitly  intended  to  stabilise 
farmers’ incomes and to reduce overproduction. These regulations have provided the main 
policy framework for the introduction of agri-environmental schemes (or PES schemes) in the 
EU. In Germany, the respective Rural Development Plans (RDP) (schemes and measures) 
vary  widely  in  terms  of  number,  design,  targeted  environmental  problem(s),  and  content  
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between the federal states. As one obligatory component, each RDP has to include a PES 
scheme, with the EU financing up to 75% of the costs and the states contributing the rest. 
Farmers can participate voluntarily in the respective schemes and have to commit to them for 
five years. To get financial support, farmer’s activities need to exceed mere compliance with 
the principles of GFP. Only an individual farmer’s income losses – opportunity  costs for 
introducing/continuing) a certain farming practice – are to be compensated, plus a maximum 
incentive component of 20% of the opportunity costs (see e.g. Bruckmeier & Schubert 1996). 
In Saxony, all RDPs – here coined ‘Environmentally Friendly Agriculture’ (Umweltgerechte 
Landwirtschaft, UL 1-3) – that were implemented between 1994 und 2008 included only one 
measure explicitly targeting farm trees, concerning specifically the maintenance of scattered 
fruit-tree meadows. Here, premiums paid amounted to 205 €/ha of scattered fruit-tree meadow 
plus 3 €/tree, up to a total maximum of 450 €/ha (Bruckmeier & Schubert 1996). Figure 2 
sketches the supported land area from 1994 to 2008. The supported area never exceeded 1,700 
ha and was during the whole period well below 15% – mostly even below 10% – of the total 
area covered by scattered fruit-tree meadows (see Table 1). 
Figure 2 Area supported by EU co-financed PES schemes for the maintenance of scattered 
fruit-tree meadows between 1994 and 2008.  
 
Sources: Own figure, based on Bruckmeier & Schubert 1996: 75; Deimer et al. 2007: 86, 94, 96; 
SMELF 1998: 47-51; SMUL 2009b: 45; Note: Contracting periods for the different schemes may 
overlap, though no ‘double funding’ by the same measure for the same plot was allowed. No data 
available for 1998, 1999, and 2007.  
In some German states, schemes or measures within the RDPs are co-financed by national 
state  funds  and/or  by  state  funds.  All  German  states  provide  some  form  of  separate 
Contractual  Nature  Conservation  Schemes  (Vertragsnaturschutz)  which  are  targeted  at 
specific  habitat  and  species  conservation,  but  also  include  activities  to  maintain  cultural 
landscapes. These schemes are voluntary and introduced with variable but limited contract 
duration. Environmental authorities at the district level conclude contracts with individual or 
groups of farmers, or so-called  Landcare Associations (LCA, Landschaftspflegeverbände), 
and monitor and enforce them. Although there are detailed guidelines for measure design and 
related  premiums  provided  for  by  the  state,  there  is  some  flexibility  in  tailoring  actual 
contracts, thus allowing for specific local and natural conditions. Yet, agreements are mainly 
adopted in high-priority conservation areas, meaning existing nature reserves, where they are 
often  provided  to  meet  legal  compensation  needs.  In  Saxony,  several  nature-protection 
programs for agriculture, fish ponds, and forestry were established in the 1990s. With respect 
to farm trees, among others, the plantation and renewal of scattered fruit trees, hedgerows, 
shrubs, and riparian woods have been financed. These project-oriented payments could also 
be used to finance project-related preparation and management costs, machineries, and costs 
for the acquisition of land. However, the impact of these programs has been rather low. For 
example, between 2000 and 2006, only 49 ha of hedgerows were planted, a further 120 ha of 
hedgerows regenerated and supplemented, and 2,700 scattered fruit trees planted on 21 ha 
(Deimer et al. 2007). A total of 14 LCA in Saxony, which operate at the district level, have 
played an important role for the plantation and maintenance of farm trees. Like all of the 140  
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LCA in Germany that have been established since 1986, they are voluntary collaborations 
between nature-protection associations, farmers, land owners, and municipalities mainly to 
protect the native fauna and flora as well as the biological resources in cultural landscapes and 
to support environmentally friendly land use systems and regional economic development 
(Bluemlein 2009). Their activities are financed from various sources, among others EU and 
(national) state co-financed PES schemes, compensation and land consolidation funds, and 
money provided by private individuals and businesses. In Saxony they have been, among 
other activities, planting and maintaining hedgerows and riparian woods. For example, in 
1997, 98 measures were carried out by LCA to plant 37 km of hedgerows and other protective 
woodlands (SMLEF 1998: 114f., 126).  
Apart from incentive-based schemes financed by public bodies, there are also other incentive-
based approaches and initiatives for farm trees in Saxony in place that derive their financial 
means  from  private  sources,  more  precisely,  from  project  developers  and  consumers. 
According  to  the  impact  regulations  of  German  nature  conservation  law,  any  economic 
activity,  such  as  road  construction  or  the  construction  of  industrial  parks,  that  negatively 
affects ecosystem functions and the appearance of landscapes has to be avoided, minimised, 
or in the last resort compensated for (Rundcrantz & Skärbäck 2003). In 2008, the concept of 
‘habitat banking’ (Ökokonten) was implemented in Saxony as an approach to pool financial 
obligations for compensation from different individual developers to implement larger and 
more comprehensive compensation measures, including planting of scattered fruit trees and 
hedges. Coordinated by a state-owned ‘habitat banking agency’  (Sächsische Landsiedlung 
GmbH),  farmers,  LCA,  and  other  land  users  offer  specific  measures  that  create  new  or 
enhance the quality of existing habitats that they have already carried out on a voluntary basis. 
Developers who are required to carry out compensation measures now have the option to 
(fully or partially) re-finance their costs. Importantly, once the respective compensation has 
been re-financed via the eco-accounts, those who contributed the measures are legally obliged 
to ensure adequate and permanent preservation of the established habitat (SMUL 2010b). In 
2008,  the  project  ‘Regional  Scattered  Fruit  Cycles’  (Regionale  Streuobstkreisläufe)  was 
initiated by the German Association for Landcare to provide financial and practical incentives 
for harvesting the fruit of scattered fruit trees. In three pilot regions in Saxony – Central 
Saxony, Northern Saxony, and Lusatia – comprehensive extension services for owners and 
land users of scattered fruit-tree meadows have been offered measures including advice on 
support programs, maintenance of trees and meadows, options for processing of fruits, etc. 
Further, collaborations between Streuobst producers with local associations, wine pressing 
houses (including, mobile fruit pressing facilities), distilleries, and tree nurseries have been 
organised. Finally, a marketing campaign on ‘Forgotten Diversity – Streuobst from Saxony’ 
was begun in 2009, developing some specific Streuobst products, such as apple juice, apple 
wine, apple liquor, pear wine, and jams (DVL 2010).  
5. Obstacles for participation in PES schemes for farm trees 
In this section, we elaborate on some potential obstacles for the participation of farmers in 
PES schemes for farm trees. These refer to production costs, opportunity costs, contractual 
uncertainties,  land  tenure  implications,  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  and  the  risk  of 
‘crowding out’. Some aspects may to some extent also be true for PES schemes in general, 
though most are rather specific for farm trees. The first aspect refers to the production costs 
connected with the provision of farm trees. Relatively high initial investments needed for the 
plantation of farm trees and the  continuous efforts necessary to maintain them contribute 
substantially to the reluctance of farmers and other land users to engage in PES schemes for 
farm trees (see e.g., Brodt et al. 2009). For example, Nottmeyer-Linden et al. (2000: 107) 
calculate about 26 €/tree for the plantation of scattered fruit trees and 2 €/tree/year (cutting 
every 10 years) for their maintenance. They recommend paying about 1.1 times the usual  
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compensation payments needed for ‘normal’ extensive grassland use when scattered fruit tree 
meadows are concerned. For the plantation of hedgerows and shrubs, they state 4.60 €/m
2 for 
plantation and 511 €/ha per year (every 10 years) for maintenance. The premiums offered in 
such PES schemes are often perceived as not being sufficient to compensate for the costs 
incurred.  Further,  many  PES  schemes  only  allow  for  homogenous  yearly  premiums,  not 
covering the initial investment costs. Investments in farm trees are also very asset specific. 
That is, these investments made by farmers cannot easily be transferred across time and space, 
once they have taken place. For example, a hedgerow planted by a farmer to reduce wind 
erosion or to increase biodiversity cannot simply be moved to another spot. Further, planting 
and  maintaining  of  farm  trees  is  very  knowledge  intensive  (Brodt  et  al.  2009)  and  may 
demand the use of special machinery.  
Second, other analyses have shown that farmers are very reluctant to implement measures for 
farm  trees  on  arable  land,  meaning  cases  where  farmers  face  comparatively  higher 
opportunity costs for land use, as opposed to grassland areas. Other agricultural policies may 
even  increase  the  opportunity  costs  for  planting  farm  trees,  for  example  by  providing 
payments  for  growing  energy  crops.  However,  it  is  precisely  here  where  many  of  the 
ecosystem services provided by farm trees are in short supply and where demand would be 
high, in particular, for preventing soil erosion due to wind and water, but also for maintaining 
biodiversity (Reeg 2008). Examining the correlation between local natural conditions and 
demand for PES schemes in general Osterburg (2000) finds that the demand for PES schemes 
is  significantly  higher  in  regions  with  relatively  poor  natural  conditions  due  to  poor  soil 
quality or being mountainous regions, as well as in regions with low average  yields, low 
stocking rates, and low land use intensity. Further, the demand for PES schemes decreases if 
the related compulsory requirements are increasing. This would be relevant for farm trees that 
rely on long-term maintenance activities. Moreover, if the density of farm trees on a particular 
plot exceeds a particular point, the entire plot would not be regarded as an ‘agricultural area’. 
Currently, this is a grey area in German law and is currently decided on a case-to-case basis 
by the responsible agricultural authorities. This constitutes, however, a clear disincentive for 
land users depending on these – often fairly substantial – payments. It may even prove to be a 
sufficient incentive for the removal of tree rows and (parts) of hedgerows adjacent to plots in 
order to increase subsidised farm size and, thus, income. 
Third, PES schemes in the context of EU Rural Development Regulations as well as many 
state-financed schemes usually require the participation of farmers for at least five years. The 
continuation of such contracts after the contract period, however, is not guaranteed by the 
state. In cases that require investments, this may negatively affect the willingness of farmers 
to  commit  themselves  to  such  contracts  and,  consequently,  the  introduction  of  long-term 
contracts has been suggested (Hampicke 2001). Such long-term contracts may also avoid the 
problem that – in cases where a conservation benefit has been created which cannot be easily 
reproduced  elsewhere  –  the  farmer  is  in  the  position  to  bargain  for  higher  payments  by 
threatening not to renew the contract (Wätzold & Schwerdtner 2005). However, Stern (2003) 
argues that long-term contracts would impose risks on both contracting partners: a) political 
and administrative authorities at state level would not have the option to end the contract 
prematurely free of charge, for example in response to budgetary problems and b) farmers, in 
turn, would lose the option to react flexibly to changing market prices.  
Fourth, in most PES schemes for farm trees, farmers are conceptually treated as landowners, 
an assumption that is not supported by the reality of many European agricultural regions in 
general, and in Saxony in particular. In order to participate in PES schemes fostering the 
planting  of  farm  trees,  farmers  need  the  formal  and  official  agreement  of  landowners. 
However, apart from contractual nature-protection schemes, PES schemes do not allow for 
compensation of negotiation costs or the acquisition of land. This problem of negotiation  
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costs is even more pronounced in regions with fragmented land ownership, as is the case in 
Saxony. Yet, there is also a risk involved on the part of landowners that, if they agree to the 
planting of farm trees on their land, future potential lease holders may not want to lease land 
covered by farm trees or may want to bargain for lower land rents because of this. Further, a 
lock-in effect may be observed, since investments in farm trees only break even after the end 
of a current lease contract. Here, a land owner may opt for increasing land rent. In turn, if the 
current landlord dies and an heir raises rent, the investment may be endangered if the farmer 
does not want to or cannot pay the elevated rent. 
Sixth,  consumer  and/or  societal  willingness  to  pay  does  not  necessarily  go  along  with 
environmental scarcity as assessed, for example, by environmentalists and other experts. It is 
a well-known fact that some symbolic ‘charismatic’ species (Tisdell & Swarna Nantha 2007) 
or  landscape  features  may  attract  much  more  public  attention  than  others.  In  consumers’ 
perceptions, aesthetic aspects may also play a more important role than detailed, materialistic 
ecosystem services accounts, which are favoured by natural scientists. Willingness to pay 
seems high for some types of farm trees, especially for scattered fruit-tree meadows (see e.g., 
Zander & Waibel 2005). In other cases, however, the necessary financial means cannot be 
raised  from  society.  Finally,  as  with  other  PES  schemes  as  well,  there  is  the  danger  of 
‘crowding out environmental virtues’, meaning that farmers will only provide farm trees if 
they are paid for it, whereas they used to provide this societal benefit voluntarily, prior to the 
introduction of PES schemes (Vatn 2010). 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown that there has only been a rather restricted portfolio of measures 
within PES schemes available to foster the development of farm trees in Saxony. This finding 
is in line with the results of an evaluation of agri-environmental schemes in the EU, where it 
has been strongly recommend that a landscape approach should be followed that ensures the 
inclusion of farm trees, such as hedgerows and willow plantations, in EU funding programs 
(European Commission 1998: 140f.). Most PES schemes in Saxony have been focused on the 
maintenance of scattered fruit-tree meadows, though some project-related funding for planting 
of scattered fruit trees and – to a lesser extent – for hedgerows was also identified. Moreover, 
the participation of farmers and other relevant actors in these schemes has been relatively low 
compared with the total area covered by the respective farm tree types. Obviously, in Saxony 
the existing PES schemes as well as the other policy approaches have not been at all sufficient 
to stop the drastic decline of scattered fruit-tree meadows and isolated trees there. Yet, it 
remains to be investigated whether they have in fact been dampening the decline to some 
extent. Further, the portfolio of measures and the participation in PES schemes can only partly 
explain the increase of other farm tree types, such as woodlots, hedgerows, shrublands, and 
tree  rows.  Possible  explanations  for  this  development  include  that  these  farm  trees  have 
expanded in size due to natural growth that has not been actively restrained by land users; 
perhaps these areas have been treated as set-aside. It may also be the case that some farmers 
or  other  land  users  have  planted  hedgerows  even  without  financial  assistance.  Perhaps 
idealistic  rationales  have  been  at  work  here,  or  they  did  not  participate  in  PES  schemes 
because of the restrictions that would have been involved with formal contracting. In this 
case, they may have valued the option to reverse their decision (to grow farm trees) without 
possibly high exit costs. Alternatively, very small farmers (below 2 ha) may not have been 
able to participate in EU co-financed PES schemes, because they are not eligible. Here, the 
only recently developed and implemented alternatives in Saxony (Habitat banking, ‘Regional 
Scattered Fruit Cycles’) may foster the planting and maintenance of farm trees in the future, 
particularly for such small farmers. 
We turn now to the question of what can be done to increase the participation of farmers in 
PES schemes for farm trees. Based on our investigation, we developed these suggestions:  
  11 
1)  Regionalised premiums for PES schemes that better account for variances, such as in soil 
quality,  that  sometimes  result  in  high  opportunity  costs  for  farmers,  may  increase 
participation. However, implementing such a differentiated approach would entail higher 
transaction  costs  for  administration  and  planning.  Still,  contractual  nature-protection 
schemes for farm trees that are project-oriented, that is where premiums and conditions 
are negotiated individually based on calculations in project plans, seem to show promising 
levels of cost-effectiveness particularly for complex measures related to farm trees.  
2)  Since the planting and maintaining of farm trees is often very labour, time, and knowledge 
intensive, co-operative approaches may be helpful to reduce related costs, for example, for 
special machinery. Coordination between farmers is also required because the specific 
spatial configuration of farm trees across landscapes is critical to the provision of many 
ecosystem  services,  for  example  water  purification  services  (Goldman  et  al.  2007). 
Successful examples of such environmental co-operatives can be found in the Netherlands 
(Slangen & Polman 2002). Alternatively, demonstration projects could induce farmer-to-
farmer  discussions  about  options  for  support,  plantation,  maintenance,  and  regional 
marketing (Brodt et al. 2009). Here, Landcare Associations could play a greater role.  
3)  Agricultural economists regularly stress that the effectiveness as well as cost-effectiveness 
of PES would increase, if outcome-oriented rather than measure-oriented payments were 
to  be  applied  (see  e.g.  Wätzold  &  Schwerdtner  2005)  Furthermore,  result-oriented 
remuneration would increase the innovation potential, reduce information asymmetries, 
and promote self-interest, co-operation, continuity, and farmers’ intrinsic motivations and 
interests  regarding  environmental  problems  (Gerowitt  et  al.  2003).  However,  the  high 
complexity, heterogeneity, and variability of ecological systems, such as farm trees, make 
it  difficult  to  apply  result-oriented  remuneration.  Planting  activities,  for  instance,  may 
result in rather stochastic, uncertain, and very much delayed (environmental) effects, such 
as  the  recurrence  of  certain  rare  plants  or  birds  nesting  in  a  particular  hedgerow  or 
woodlot.  Thus,  a  farmer’s  ‘investment’  would  be  confronted  by  a  highly  uncertain 
premium level or even no premium at all (Hampicke 2001). 
Finally, we point to some lessons that can be learnt for the wider debate on PES schemes in 
agroecosystems.  As  stressed  before,  many  obstacles  we  identified  for  the  participation  of 
farmers in PES schemes for farm trees are also relevant for other agroecosystems and have 
indeed already been identified. The specific features of farm trees, however, bring particular 
aspects  related  to  land  tenure,  the  temporal  (long-term  investment)  perspective,  and  high 
opportunity  costs  to  the  forefront.  Solutions  that  may  be  developed  to  overcome  these 
problems for PES schemes for farm trees are likely to improve other PES schemes dealing 
with  similar  resource  characteristics.  The  example  of  PES  schemes  for  farm  trees  also 
highlights  one  of  the  major  challenges  for  the  protection  and  preservation  of  cultural 
landscapes:  they  are  man-made,  unlike  primeval  forests,  and  thus  need  to  be  preserved, 
managed, and maintained continuously. This, however, demands constant efforts – not only 
financially, but for improving the design of PES schemes and other policy approaches as well. 
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